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Is anthropology legal? Earthquakes, blitzkrieg, and ethical futures 
Edward Simpson, SOAS University of London 
 
Abstract: This article is a contribution to the growing literature that suggests that the 
methodological and writing practices of anthropology are out of kilter with the times. The 
processual structures and regulative mechanisms that produce anthropological knowledge 
were formed when objection and engagement were not the almost-inevitable consequence of 
publication. Those who inform anthropological research now frequently object to the ways 
they are represented. My argument here focuses particularly on the relationship between the 
ethical structures of anthropology and the nature of objection. Thus far, the consistent 
response from anthropologists has been to explain away objections as differences in 
epistemology. In this light, I draw on an objection to my own research on postdisaster 
reconstruction in India to ask why there should not be disagreement between anthropologists 
and those who inform research. I also illustrate why the epistemological explanation is now 
insufficient and why new structures of research and writing might be required to make the 
leap from an age of objection. 
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blitzkrieg (German): lighting war; sudden and surprise attack 
 
 
 
I do not know exactly when the age of objection dawned on the anthropological landscape. 
Those who lived in the houses close to Malinowski’s tent probably thought he was a queer 
cove on occasion, but their opinions have not survived. Dawn was more clearly signaled by 
the emergence of anguished accounts by anthropologists who had published material that 
those who informed their ethnography objected to (see Brettell 1993 for an overview). 
Generally, those who objected did not like how they were represented. Specifically, they 
thought the anthropologist had made misleading connections, revealed secrets, and drawn on 
inappropriate evidence. Others have made the profound but difficult point that they have a 
right to lead “unexamined” lives (Scheper-Hughes 2001: xvi). Objections might also be 
raised to the perpetuation of the extractive and metropolitan traditions of anthropology in a 
more general sense. 
Objection is an exciting challenge to complacency, a signal that things could be done 
differently. Objection also signifies that anthropology is being read, and read by those with 
both inclination and motivation to articulate their objections. Having said that, when 
objections were raised to my anthropology, I found the experience both stressful and 
unpleasant. Why? Also, why should it have come as such a confounding surprise? I had not 
been trained to expect, accommodate, or respond to it. I had spent more than twenty years 
diligently refining a disciplinary practice, which my objectors simply dismissed as 
“fiction”—in the “made up” sense, not in the nicer sense of Writing culture (Clifford and 
Marcus 1986).  
Global structures and locations of power have changed since the coming of modern 
anthropology. As David Mosse succinctly puts it: the desk has collapsed into the field (2006: 
937). People and things are mixed up more and differently: China builds roads and grows 
food in Africa; India is one of the largest investors in the economy of the United Kingdom; 
everybody’s carbon emissions are melting polar and Andean ice. Anthropological knowledge 
 
 
is no longer “our” exclusive possession; “we” are no longer a “we” (although the idea that 
“we” once were is usually overstated). For former colonists, the discipline helped to ease and 
explain the transition from colonial to postcolonial world order. Postcolonial anthropology 
inherited a mixture of guilt, self-interest, and intellectual curiosity, which, arguably, continue 
to form the structure the discipline.  
Now there are political movements in many parts of the world that have deliberately 
rekindled memories of colonialism, integrating an idea of revenge or redistributive justice 
into their political mission. Invasions, bombings, and drones have given rise to new forms of 
inequality and conflict. Post-postmodern states of precariousness have been introduced. Parts 
of the world are off limits because they are too dangerous; other parts of the world restrict 
access through border and visa controls. Post-postcolonial anthropology faces new 
challenges: shifting empires and ethics and notions of democracy and truth. Anthropology 
should belong to these times. 
Information technologies have transformed the accessibility, reach, and pace of 
communication. Social media in particular have encouraged a general awareness of the 
politics of self-presentation and representation. In some ways, social networking has made 
mainstream many of the ideas about relationships, kinship, and connectedness that 
anthropologists had been talking about behind closed doors for decades. The ways in which 
data are stored, sorted, and shared continue to shift. Transnationalism has created bridges and 
fences that do not simply recreate the older patterns and sympathies of nation-states. 
Phenomena such as deforestation, terrorism, and disease, once framed by the intricacies of 
particular localities, are often now considered global concerns; at other moments, one part of 
the world worries about such issues in another. Anthropology has new terrains and modes of 
engagement, as well as new publics and audiences.  
 
 
The subject area of anthropology has both expanded and contracted because of new 
geopolitics. New forms of anthropology are emerging outside the traditional university and 
national settings. Significantly, for many anthropologists, radical difference or alterity has 
ceased to be the core generative idea of the discipline. Like colleagues in New Delhi, for 
example, with whom I have been debating such issues, I find the idea of absolute cultural 
difference or relativism or ontology untenable intellectually and politically. But then, those 
who objected to my anthropology perhaps think this stance is part of the problem, because 
they thrive on the public idea of cultural relativism. Instead, as I have gradually moved from 
ethnographic practice rooted in a particular location toward the anthropology of big stuff, 
earthquakes, infrastructure, and the like, I have found myself focusing on processes, 
consequences, and the ripples caused by things rather than on bounded groups of people. 
People still matter, of course; however, when previously religious, regional, or linguistic 
labels might have seemed the most salient units of analysis, I now tend to see such things as 
layers that are nestled within other kinds of layering such as institutions, policies, histories, 
ideologies, and so on. 
 
Writing people 
 
Together, these global trends alongside shifting topics and writing and publishing 
technologies mean that those who inform anthropology are often now in a position to read 
what is written about them. Consequently, anthropological writing about cheated, 
disenchanted, and angry informants/research participants/interlocutors is emerging as an 
important and challenging subgenre. This new tradition is clearly in its infancy, not having 
moved far beyond the self-justificatory trope. The fact of disagreement is to be explained, 
often as a piece of anthropology itself; rendering it an intra-anthropological subject matter, 
 
 
which effects a double exclusion of informants. Disagreement or objection emerges, usually 
quite genuinely, as differing epistemologies and expectations. Objection has yet to be 
embraced, solicited, or understood to signal the possibility that anthropology needs to be 
done differently. However, before I continue with this tack, I want to rhetorically ask you 
why there should not be disagreement between anthropologists and those who inform 
research? Why should we expect informants to approve texts? What kind of relationship does 
this imply? 
The first time I deliberately shared my anthropology with someone in India was a 
pointed learning experience. The man in question, whom I felt I knew quite well, was very 
angry about what I had written. He said I had misquoted him, turned his story into a banality, 
and portrayed him as an eccentric. Furthermore, I had not even bothered to get his name 
right. Just moments before he told me this, I had been excited about sharing my work, 
believing I had quoted him precisely and generously, represented his story as something 
profound and bold, and portrayed him as a heroic pioneer. I had, of course, used a pseudonym 
rather than his real name, as was expected of me in universityland, which is why he thought I 
had got his name wrong. This humbling experience made me begin to understand what 
anthropology often does to people, and what it cannot do. 
Anthropology puts people through the mill. At one level, anthropologists turn people 
into writing. Writing is words, sentences, and paragraphs, which cannot replicate the 
complexities and particular sense of self-integrity possessed by an individual. Anthropology 
can be neither a vehicle for the communication of the unspoken consciousness of an other nor 
a reflection of an ego. The gaze and techniques are geared to do other things, which have 
been characterized in many varied ways. Hastrup (2004), for example, suggests anthropology 
is a kind of explanation beyond the truth of events themselves. Anthropology is not simply 
knowledge about particular events, practices, and ideas but about the processes by which 
 
 
these come to appear meaningful, inevitable or mandatory, contestable or ridiculous. My own 
experiences of sharing academic writing have also impressed on me that anthropology is a 
rather violent and abrupt process, which takes place slowly in a gradual and usually friendly 
fashion: pious fraudulence, professionalized duplicity, or ritualistic sanctimony? 
In addition, there are other issues to consider here too, which add to the difficulties of 
non-anthropologists understanding anthropology, such as the precarious intellectual edifice 
which is an anthropological argument, and the drift and consequences of our own 
professional ethics codes, but I will deal with these at greater length in what is to come. This 
article points to some of the directions in which anthropology might need to shift in the age 
of objection. The research material is drawn from my own Gujarat ethnography and 
correspondence and encounters in the United Kingdom. I conclude with a salutary discussion 
of research ethics and questions about the possible legal status of published anthropology. 
 
Background and key terms 
 
In 2004 I contributed a chapter titled “Hindutva as a rural planning paradigm” to an edited 
collection on popular political mobilization in India. Nine years later, two sadhus (“priests”) 
from a Hindu religious movement presented me with their written objections. In what 
follows, I reflect on what I wrote, how they responded, and what might have happened in the 
intervening years. The encounter made me appreciate that anthropology is run through with 
enchanted ideas that are largely incomprehensible to a generally educated reader expecting 
“science.” Paradoxically almost, some forms of anthropology have moved toward becoming 
an exotic form of knowledge in a world that is increasingly seen as “post-exotic” (Elie 2012). 
However, the more constructive conclusion from this encounter is: anthropological 
knowledge is humanitarian, disruptive, and important but needs to develop more robust and 
 
 
politically astute ways of explaining, presenting, and defending itself.  
The “Hindutva” of the 2004 chapter’s title means “Hindu-ness” and is associated with 
various kinds of Hindu culturalist and nationalist philosophy (Savarkar 1938; for contrasting 
overviews see Bhatt 2001; Hansen 1999; Mathur 2008). Today these ideas vary in status 
between unequivocal truth, common sense, pride, and a stance. Significantly, the various 
strands of nationalist philosophy deny a distinction between political rule and religion, seeing 
this as an artifice of “Western” cultures and a legacy of colonialism. Instead, the ideas of 
Indian civilization, which are understood exclusively as the ideas of Hindu civilization, see 
rule and religiosity as part of the same complex (Upadhyaya 1965, for example). Hindutva as 
a political ideology emerged strongly in the early twentieth century as part of the anticolonial 
movement. In the postcolonial era, as the ideology was encouraged to enter the mainstream at 
all levels, Hindutva became an increasingly nationalistic way of thinking about the 
organization of history, politics, and social life. In my 2004 chapter, I suggested that variants 
of such ideas served as paradigmatic guides for some of the organizations that had 
reconstructed villages after an earthquake in Gujarat, western India, in 2001. 
My fieldwork at this time allowed me to see at first hand the aftermath of mass anti-
Muslim violence in Gujarat during 2002. I sat through some of the ensuing “hate speeches” 
made by Hindu politicians in the name of post-earthquake reconstruction and nationalist 
politics. I also saw and heard horse trading as a neoliberal arrangement brought public and 
private partners together in the reconstruction initiative. Consequently, in my 2004 chapter, I 
also made the unremarkable claim that an earthquake in Gujarat had proved an opportunity 
for many organizations, especially those of religious and cultural bent, to advance particular 
agendas. I use the term “unremarkable” not to be self-deprecating but because opportunism 
was everywhere during those early years after the earthquake: I thought I was restating the 
obvious. 
 
 
This immediate post-earthquake period also marked the deliberate intensification and 
expansion of nationalist politics (see Shah 2002; Shani 2007), which eventually brought 
Narendra Modi to power on a BJP ticket as the national leader of India in 2014. The BJP or 
Bharatiya Janata Party is commonly thought of as the Hindu nationalist party in India, and, as 
the then president of the party publicly said as far back as 2002, the “experiment” in 
populism in Gujarat was the preparatory step to pushing its agenda to the national level.1 In 
fact, it seems unlikely that Modi would have been able to come to power in Gujarat in 2001, 
at least in the way that he did, without the earthquake. He and his advisors used the 
aftershocks to topple an incumbent Keshubhai Patel from the chief minister’s seat; Modi 
became the chief minister of the state without having faced an election. His subsequent rule 
over Gujarat is commonly associated with strong economic growth figures, violence, 
firebrand politics, and rapacious industrialization. Against this backdrop, in my work on the 
aftermath of the earthquake, I chose to focus on, among other things, the everyday 
manufactured seep of nationalistic ideas into the lives of ordinary people. I saw that this 
“seep” was often encouraged by mechanisms and processes that were clearly both organized 
and orchestrated. 
 
Plot, main cast, and bit players 
 
Those who objected to my own anthropology in an unpublished and unsigned document 
called me an “academic fraud” writing with “improper ideological bias” and “substandard 
ethnography.” Those I imagine to be the authors are members of a Hindu religious movement 
that had “adopted” a village in Gujarat through a public-private reconstruction initiative. This 
village was not particularly damaged by the earthquake, but this significant point seems to 
have been allowed to fade over the years. The movement built a new village slightly away 
 
 
from the original location and gave it a new name. As other organizations were doing in 
hundreds of other villages, the movement facilitated the construction of infrastructure and 
houses. They also built a temple in the center of the new village; this was, significantly, a 
rather less common occurrence throughout the region as a whole. 
From my point of view, evidence for my claim that the earthquake advanced a 
particular political project was ubiquitous. New temples appeared; villages, streets, and 
buildings were renamed; and “victims” of the earthquake were demonstrably pressured to 
adopt particular ways of being. Given the violence, jingoism, and general fervor that 
saturated Gujarat at the time, it did not occur to me that provocation would be found in my 
conclusions. 
In 2009 John Zavos, chief editor of the original book, told me that “BAPS” had 
concerns about my chapter. BAPS (or Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam) is the Hindu 
movement that had built one of the three villages referred to in the 2004 chapter. Founded in 
1907, BAPS is particularly popular in Gujarat and among the sizable diaspora overseas. I do 
not know how BAPS learned of the chapter or developed semipublic concerns. John Zavos 
emerged as a broker, although aside from brief email exchanges I do not recall him asking me 
directly about the contents of the chapter. At the time, he was also starting to conduct 
research on the movement himself.  
In between the original publication and the delivery of the objection, I edited a book 
along with Aparna Kapadia called The idea of Gujarat (Simpson and Kapadia 2010). Hanna 
Kim, who conducts research with BAPS, was one of the contributing authors. During the 
production of that volume, she forwarded our considerable editorial correspondence about her 
chapter to BAPS for scrutiny and comment. She later apologized to me for this unusual act, I 
believe sincerely. However, the episode made me aware of the kinds of relationships 
researchers working with BAPS have to entertain to retain research access.  
 
 
Kim’s chapter (2010) argued that Swaminarayan (BAPS) ways of being are not 
dependent on Western notions of individualism, autonomy, and subjectivity. There is 
poignancy in this conclusion because as a woman Kim cannot speak to the sadhus in person 
and has to use a proxy. She critically reviewed the literature that portrays the movement as a 
player in right-wing political Hinduism (especially Nussbaum 2007; McKean 1996; Shukla 
1997). At the time, our editorial line was that Kim’s project was a worthwhile and unsettling 
one, but that we should not uncritically reproduce ideas given to her by sadhus without 
contextualizing them against a broader backdrop of events in Gujarat. However, Kim’s claim 
(also 2009, 2012) that the movement was “apolitical” raised particular intellectual and 
methodological concerns for me. 
Like Kim, BAPS also repeatedly stresses this sentiment and has developed a well-
rehearsed narrative to support the claim to be “apolitical”; but what BAPS appears to mean 
by this is that—variously, and not consistently—the trustees of their temples are not members 
of political parties. Their statement is not and cannot be a denial of involvement in what 
social scientists generally consider as politics in the more general sense, as I discuss further 
below. 
At the suggestion of John Zavos, I arranged to meet with the sadhus for a discussion. 
Despite having invited one person, four men turned up at the School for Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS) and caused considerable disruption in the corridor. The spokesman on that 
occasion told me that when they had visited Dr. Zavos at the University of Manchester, he 
told them I was writing a book. They also told me that they had come with an “open heart to 
improve my scholarship,” but that they were also interested in just punishment for my 
slander, institutional discipline, or my resignation to save the face of my institution. The 
sadhu said that anthropology should be “representative” and that there should be 
“triangulation” in my method. I tried to explain, naïvely with hindsight, that ethnographic 
 
 
fieldwork had given me a good overview of the region, and we could also think of this tacit 
or background knowledge as part of the “triangulation” process. 
The original spokesman came again with another sadhu in 2013, this time carrying 110 
printed pages of objection. In my 2004 chapter, there were four pages about the activities of 
BAPS (Simpson 2004: 154–158; they also comment briefly on 2008). Their document is 
titled “BAPS response to Dr Edward Simpson’s works.” The first section sets out their case 
and runs through at great length a matter on which there is no disagreement, although our 
conclusions vary. The second carefully outlines the policies and procedures through which 
village adoption and design took place. The third section is an attempt to demonstrate that 
BAPS has no favorable relationship with the state in Gujarat and no links with any political 
form of Hinduism. 
The document presumes the existence of “facts” that can be accurately presented 
irrespective of methodology, discipline, or political positioning. It reads and is structured like 
a legal case. What strikes me most, however, is the straightforward nature of the world they 
describe: government policy determines how things happen; regulations regulate; building 
codes produce concrete realities; BAPS simply acts within the procedures of a regulatory 
state. In their presentation of post-earthquake reconstruction, there is no slippage of meaning, 
ambiguity, or room for different interpretations. While the authors could well have had their 
own reasons for presenting the world in this way, I doubt it was a self-conscious strategy. Of 
the two sadhus who may have written the document, neither was directly involved in the 
adoption and reconstruction of villages in Gujarat. At the time, one was an undergraduate 
student and the other was yet to be initiated; neither has a background in social science. 
Instead, I suspect their approach to what I had written points to a more general disparity 
between how critical social anthropologists describe the world and how others see the world 
as working. 
 
 
At the most general level, anthropology has become a discipline for which things are 
contextual, in-the-making, hybrid, illusive, and ambiguous. In part, of course, the origins of 
this style lie with the “crisis of representation” and the “self-reflexive turn” in anthropology 
(attributed to Clifford and Marcus 1986). At another level, it is underpinned by the organizing 
ideas current within the discipline: discourses make realties, power lies between the cracks, 
uncertainties produce realities, ideas have histories which are contingent and can be taken 
apart, and so forth. 
Moving closer to the subject of my own 2004 chapter, works by Scott (1999) and 
Ferguson (1990) have convinced us of how the state really works. For many such authors, 
bureaucracy, for example, has come to be thought of as a form of negotiation and competition 
rather than an uncontested process (Hull 2012). The state and other organizations have been 
shown to work within discursive realms, which mean they act quite at odds with how other 
people think they should act. Charisma, authority, and history drown even the possibility of 
planning decisions and bureaucratic procedures, as they exist on paper, actually determining 
how things are done in any straightforward sense. Humanitarianism can be deconstructed and 
historicized (Fassin 2012). Development projects can be shown to act according to their own 
institutional culture rather than in the interests of those they are supposed to serve (Mosse 
2005). In sum, the certainties on which current anthropology is based have become most 
“unscientific” (in the common usage of the world). The science of anthropology, if it can be 
thought of in that way, is about complexity, ambiguity, partiality, and shades thereof.  
My own work too is framed by a twist of reality which I think, in part, led the sadhus to 
understand what I had written in the way that they did.  
 
Research in Gujarat 
 
 
 
I had conducted research in Gujarat before the earthquake of 2001. Partially because of this, 
my initial attention was drawn to my friends who survived. When I first visited after the 
earthquake in the second half of that year, it was obvious that the prevailing worry of those I 
knew was uncertainty about what was to come next. They were struggling to interact with 
and understand the many organizations who had come as humanitarians in the aftermath. 
Many of those who came to intervene saw the subjects of their humanitarianism as victims in 
a double sense: victims of tragedy and victims of impoverished cultural and religious 
regimes. The public-private partnership apparatus, filtered through the state government as a 
condition of loans from development banks, allowed those intervening to gift new forms of 
understanding. State sanction allowed these interventionists to build villages imbued with 
particular ideologies, some possibly with longer-term collaborative goals in mind. The desire 
to help those who are suffering usually appears as an unquestionable moral imperative. It is 
then a delicate matter to critically engage or question the “good works” of humanitarians.2 I 
do not think for one moment that “good work” is inherently bad, but it is never neutral or 
innocent as the document the sadhus prepared claims. From the perspective of critical 
anthropology, “good work” can only be a form of politics and intention. 
As the research went on in Gujarat it became increasingly obvious that most of what 
is known about disasters is produced by those who have a stake in presenting reconstruction 
as a success. The reasons for this might be many, but to name a few: to preserve a mandate, 
satisfy auditors, or to demonstrate that stated aims have been fulfilled. The hundreds of 
reports produced by organizations such as BAPS, development agencies, and governments 
about the earthquake are not about failure, any more than they are about the lives of ordinary 
people. As Foucault aptly words it: “discourses are practices which systematically form the 
objects of which they speak” (1972: 49). The types of discourse or general knowledge that 
 
 
emerge about natural disasters serve particular ends and actively make disasters appear in 
particular ways.  
It is against this backdrop that I eventually attempted to describe the aftermath of a 
natural disaster from the point of view of those who were affected by external interventions 
(Simpson 2013). If we take this naïve perspective seriously, then quite often humanitarians 
appear as strangers and trespassers. Their actions, gifts, and ideas of a better future no longer 
seem routinely sensible or so morally untouchable. On the contrary, humanitarianism may 
well appear as a form of self-interest when viewed from the perspective of those who are 
affected by it. Of course, this is not how humanitarians understand their role—it cannot be; 
but that is the very point I have attempted to make in my work. 
My framing of post-earthquake reconstruction was not what the sadhus expected social 
science to be, let alone a good account of humanitarian reason. The argument was not 
intended simply as a criticism of humanitarianism inspired by religious and organizational 
values but rather as an analysis of the interplay of post-earthquake reconstruction initiatives, 
policies, and institutions. The example of the village at the core of this dispute was an 
exploration of a general theme that characterized the landscape of post-earthquake 
reconstruction in a broader sense; indeed, other parts of the 2004 chapter told similar stories 
about the consequences of the intervention of other organizations. This was not a story about 
the interventions of a particular religious movement; rather, it was a story about a world in 
which there was an advancing tide of a distinct nationalist politics within which there were 
multiple points of view and truths. 
The account I wrote focused on people who lived outside and beyond planned 
interventions, as well as on those who were directly affected by them. These people 
introduced distracting and unpleasant details that are at odds with the hermetic description of 
the world an institution might provide. My method refused, deliberately, to explain the 
 
 
outcomes of post-earthquake interventions in the language of the development organizations. 
In short, I was writing from outside the paradigms through which institutions see and 
understand their own interventions. This approach was meant to be unsettling and 
challenging, but not to produce high dudgeon. 
 
Putting air back into the vacuum 
 
The bruising document presented to me at SOAS is also concerned with discrediting my 
research. In this respect, I began to read both the document and the mechanisms through 
which it had been brought into SOAS as part of a greater attempt to police and manufacture 
the boundaries of a discursive realm of transnational political Hinduism. In other words, there 
were politics and intentions in the objection, which spoke to ideas and debates far beyond the 
content of my anthropology. Other scholars have shown that it is part of the intellectual 
project of the Hindu right, of which they see BAPS to be a part, to shift the basis of ethical 
judgments, insert the trope of “Hindu hurt” within British politics, and reconfigure the nature 
of political identities (Mukta 2000). This essentially seems to me to be what sections of the 
sadhus’ document attempt to do. 
The third part of their document makes the strong claim that BAPS has no formal links 
with the Hindu right. Indeed, there are no underground tunnels or charters that I am aware of. 
However, the persistent and conspicuous nature of this distancing claim in the literature and 
web presence of the movement is curious. I know people in India and London who regularly 
attend the movement’s temples and have views that could not readily be mistaken for 
anything other than those of hard-line Hindu nationalists. It is as if the lack of official 
affiliation or membership card is sufficient evidence to sustain the claim that a religious 
movement is apolitical. 
 
 
It is difficult to translate the claim “apolitical” back into the language of anthropology: 
no word exists with currency. In the conventions of the discipline we should render it 
apolitical, as we do with terms from other languages that do not translate well into the 
languages in which anthropology is written. It is not just that the realm of the political has 
spread like a slick into all areas of social life, the very claim to being “apolitical” can itself 
only be a political contrivance. From the perspective of critical anthropology, the kind of 
Hindu sociality the movement promotes—its ideas about history, exclusivity, and everyday 
morality—resonate strongly with the interests of the Hindu political right; consequently, 
while the management of movement may be formally “apolitical,” many of the sect’s 
followers are not. This in turn gives the sect considerable clout in local political setups and 
reflects what social scientists in the Weberian tradition would call a strong “elective affinity” 
with the political organizations of the Hindu right. Such affiliations are, of course, a routine 
part of the democratic process, in which lobbyists, interest groups, and so forth combine to 
exert greater pressure.  
Other scholars have also noted the concerted and efforts BAPS makes to distance itself 
from the institutions of the organized political right (Anderson 2010; Dwyer 1996). In 2005 a 
UK parliamentary commission investigated the links between the BAPS’s temple in London 
and “international terrorism” (Denham 2005). The use of the word “terrorism” was 
misguided and must have served as a useful foil to obscure rather more routine connections 
with the Hindu right. Inevitably, given the terms of its engagement, the commission 
concluded that no evidence existed to link the temple to terrorism. 
In the course of the evidence, nothing however was presented to show that BAPS and 
the political organizations of the Hindu right do not have routine connections, such as 
overlapping bases of support and interests in common; nor was there any discussion of the 
relationship between the BJP and the making of the grassroots support for the party and 
 
 
movement. There was no account of BAPS’s plan for becoming a national movement in 
India, which according to Raymond Williams (2001: 233) includes emphasizing “all-India” 
aspects of Hinduism and stressing the close association of national identity and Hindu 
“culture.” It also includes building temples in key political and symbolic cities in the country, 
such as Delhi and Ayodhya (Anderson 2010). Furthermore, there was no public exploration 
of the movement’s designs on the Gujarati diaspora and no analysis of its extremely 
particular presentation of religion and history, which some scholars have likened directly to 
Hindu nationalism (Mukta 2000). 
The suggestion that BAPS had links to the Hindu right in India in my 2004 chapter 
seemed unequivocal at the time. In 2001 Narendra Modi was shoehorned into government 
never having faced an election. In February and March 2002, he was chief minister while 
there was mass killing in the name of religion in many parts of Gujarat. His government has 
consistently been found by various investigative committees as somewhere between supine 
and complicit in the bloodshed. The BAPS’s village was inaugurated by him in May of the 
same year, and given press coverage, at the height of the communal surge in the state. 
Similarly, the temple in North London was inaugurated in 1995 by L.K. Advani, who was 
then the firebrand leader of the BJP in India. The inauguration of religious spaces by political 
figures who are well known in India to represent strong forms of Hindu nationalist ideas 
suggests an active relationship and identification between the movement and politics. As 
Anderson (2010) has also documented, BAPS hosts figures from the Hindu political right in 
North London and has made public pronouncements in support of some of the key aims of 
the formal nationalist movement. 
Prior to the parliamentary investigation of 2005, there had been other allegations about 
the use of public funds from Britain to further the cause of the Hindu right in the aftermath of 
the earthquake in Gujarat. One fund-raising initiative that came in for close scrutiny was 
 
 
SEWA International, an offshoot of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS), an organization 
that is in turn modeled on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS is the 
organization most associated with the promotion the Hindu cause in India. A report also 
published in 2004 by the activist organization South Asia Watch Limited claimed that more 
than two million pounds raised by SEWA International in the UK had gone directly to 
funding the Hindu right in India.3 A senior UK politician disassociated himself from the 
organization as a consequence. Investigators from the Charity Commission were refused 
visas to visit India. Ultimately, SEWA International was cleared of financial wrongdoing in 
the UK, but investigations laid bare the connections, modes of operation, and the ethos of the 
organization. 
In 2012 the same SEWA International opened a rural training center adjacent to the 
BAPS’s temple in the village mentioned in my 2004 chapter. At that time, I had suggested 
BAPS was furthering a broader agenda. “No,” the sadhus had said. Narendra Modi himself 
landed on the village’s new helipad to inaugurate the building. Not many villages in India 
have helipads, and this one had presumably been built to facilitate the arrival of spiritual and 
political leaders from faraway urban centers. On this occasion, Modi paid homage to Dr. 
Hedgewar, the founder of the RSS.4 In his speech, he confused (with a smile) the actual name 
of the village with the spiritual leader of BAPS, calling it “Pramukh Swami’s Village” 
(nagar). Perhaps, I thought, while watching Modi’s speech on the Internet, with 110 pages 
BAPS simply doth protest too much. 
 
The publisher’s take 
 
Varying in form and intensity, this story has been with me for most of this century. As 
various other institutions and publishers became involved, their reactions began to make me 
 
 
suspect that most anthropology has a precarious legal status. At the time I was first presented 
with the document objecting to my anthropology, I was working on a book about the 
earthquake. As part of my immediate response to the document I wrote a long and detailed 
chapter based on a conventional range of anthropological source material about the various 
roles BAPS had played in post-earthquake reconstruction. 
The manuscript got stuck with the publisher. Academic reviewers saw no problems 
with it—one wondered why I did not just use the term “fascists” for the general political turn 
I was describing in Gujarat; or, more carefully, as “promoters of neo-corporatism in the 
classic form.” However, the pragmatic publisher knew better. He pointed to the ways in 
which colonial and postcolonial history has allowed Hinduism to appear as “innocent” and 
“truthful” in the United Kingdom, and how the growing narrative of “Hindu hurt” was 
finding an increasing place in the media. He also suggested that if an Islamic organization 
had turned up in a university and made similar claims against an academic, then the story 
would make the national newspapers as a story of intimidation rather than rival truth claims. 
After considerable discussion, he insisted that nothing was to appear in the chapter of 
which I did not have a recorded interview. Should matters turn toward a court or the threat of 
legal costs, then we would stand a chance. In a stroke, his clear censure suggested to me that 
most written anthropology can probably be made to appear illegal. Most of what 
anthropologists present as evidence would be treated by the courts as hearsay, defamation, 
and/or slander. The publisher added that there was no point in hiding behind “allegedly” or 
“insinuation” or “parody,” as these devices would not withstand scrutiny either. 
To be clear, against the strongest fieldwork and methodological injunctions of the day 
(Behar 2003; Borneman and Hammoudi 2009), the accumulated sense of things 
anthropologists gain from long-term research and participant observation in the field were 
inadmissible—unpublishable in this context. I had written an anthropological monograph, 
 
 
and now I was being asked to refine and streamline sections of it and phrase it in the recorded 
words of other people. What about being there? What about participant observation and 
apprenticeships in ways of being, as in Bourdieu’s “reflexive sociology” (2008)? What about 
the apprenticeship of learning to see things from a different perspective? What about 
fieldnotes, surveys, and diaries? What about the unexpected but influential conversation, the 
seminal error of judgment, or the moment mistrust became friendship? What about the 
hunches, sensations, inclinations, the moment of a doubtful glance, or tension and 
embarrassment of an obviously overstated reassurance? The publisher was suggesting in no 
uncertain terms that the methods and materials from which anthropology is traditionally 
constructed were insufficient to withstand legal scrutiny should it come to that. 
I ask you as interested readers, how much of your research would make print if 
everything had also to be supported by recordings? 
 
Research ethics from the black-and-white era 
 
In recent years, many scholars of India have been harassed in the name of religious 
nationalism. My own treatment has been tame in comparison to others. The accusations 
leveled against me were about the representativeness and accuracy of my research, rather 
than my moral or sexual character. In the context of South Asia and its diasporas, objection to 
anthropology often builds on the same gendered and nationalistic arguments scholars are 
critical of, which makes constructive dialogue difficult; neither party is shaken from its 
conviction. In fact, if anything, the sequence and nature of these encounters only seems to 
strengthen the original belief or attitude, in a way that simply introducing greater analytical 
humility will not resolve. In other contexts, objection could be an opportunity to think 
differently and to engage in new forms of conversation. This was not my experience, and 
 
 
neither do I think that was the intention of those who produced the arguments against my 
scholarship. However, on the positive side, the experience has led me to think harder about 
anthropology’s relationship with objection, especially when this implies criticism and 
conflict.  
The question of perspective in research is an old one, perhaps addressed in most 
forthright terms by Howard Becker (1967) who simply asked: “whose side are we on?” I 
would rhetorically add to this: how and why? The “how” is intended to flag a methodological 
caution by drawing attention to the mechanics of taking sides in research and the 
epistemological implications of doing so. The “why” raises an awareness of the origins and 
texture of our own pre-theoretical personal politics, which influences, consciously or not, 
which side we take (what in ethics might be called “ordinary ethical sense”). Such 
methodological concerns and the influence of personal anthropology have, of course, been 
discussed extensively within the discipline. Still, I will claim to have been on the side of 
ethnography, regardless of how incomplete such a statement may be. However, the “whose,” 
“how,” and “why” of side-taking takes on different complexion when ethnography is written 
and made public, as I have shown. Who is on whose side is a different matter entirely when 
read by plural publics. This is an increasingly significant area of concern and one that 
remains insufficiently theorized, taught, and represented in ethical and procedural 
codifications of disciplinary practice. We might perhaps think of this as an ethics of 
engagement, the consequence of going public and engaging with objections. Indeed, the 
actual challenge here might be better conceived of as developing a method of openness 
through which objections could be seen more as contributions and welcomed rather than 
taken badly or as affront; however, in my experience this was never an option; therefore, the 
previous suggestion is a possibility but not an injunction. 
In the United Kingdom there are few resources or guidelines for such engagement, or 
 
 
established modes of writing that encourage or actively ask for contributions from others. 
There is also little institutional support for academics from either universities or research 
funders when the heat is turned up. At SOAS, the principles of the Research Ethics Code are 
integrity, honesty, openness, confidentiality, voluntary participation, avoidance of harm, 
independence and impartiality, and cultural sensitivity. Such principles are softly framed 
versions of complex areas of law, which have histories, case precedents, and specialized legal 
practices. It is therefore quite surprisingly straightforward for research ethics matters to move 
from the university to the legal arena if someone so desires.  
These codes guide research undertaken in the name of SOAS and are taught to all 
postgraduate researchers with the aim of professionalizing and focusing research practice. We 
also teach with the Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice issued by the Association 
of Social Anthropologists of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth. This document forms 
a basis for professionalized and disciplinary-specific research ethics. Unlike the general 
SOAS code, therefore, it is written specifically to anticipate the sorts of issues that might 
arise during long-term field research when using participant observation. However, these 
codes are only softly bent toward the discipline of anthropology from their origins in 
medicine. They are also tinged with what resembles postcolonial guilt. 
Despite recent revisions, these codifications seem oddly out of step with global politics 
and the realities of the research that many anthropologists actually do. On the one hand, if the 
guidelines were followed loyally, it would be difficult to conduct any research at all. On the 
other, if the general drift of the guidelines were followed as a guide to methodology, the 
result would be completely out of kilter with what a small and independent publisher would 
consider printable. I would also argue, quite generally and in no particular order of 
importance, and with no disrespect to unnamed authors of the codes of ethics, that the 
principles outlined assume greater power always to lie with the anthropologist than with 
 
 
those being researched. They are undergirded by the idea that people and communities are 
what anthropologists research, rather than institutions, ideas, or horses. They have little to say 
about intellectual property rights. Perhaps unsurprisingly, but unusually, they place the 
burden of protection and duty of care solely upon the anthropologist. Any form of informed 
consent or contracted agreement between researcher and researched makes no demands on 
the behavior of the researched whatsoever (which makes it a rare form of contract). More 
significantly, such guidelines rule out the possibility of research that is critical or damaging to 
the ways of those who primarily or secondarily informed it. Therefore, because of the 
principle of nonmaleficence, no “studying up” or writing critically about deforesters, 
polluters, torturers, warmongers, or predatory humanitarians. 
These codes are guides that help researchers think through and anticipate problems in 
research. Both research ethics codes/guides referred to above are focused primarily on the 
conduct of research but can be sensibly stretched to include the writing as well. However, 
they say nothing of the subsequent ethics of engagement, which strikes me as outmoded 
when universities and funding institutions currently place strong emphasis on both the impact 
and the dissemination of research. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that although the 
research ethics code might be seen as regulating, standardizing, and professionalizing 
research practice, one greater effect is to emolliate the institution, rendering the individual 
researcher accountable and therefore potentially vulnerable. 
The age of objection now necessitates something more than explaining objection as the 
result of differing epistemologies. As I have suggested, there is good self-interested reason to 
do so, as much method and writing will not withstand legal scrutiny, which is a mechanism 
accessible to some objectors. In addition, in the UK context there is a tangle of other 
regulation and legislation that has a direct relationship to research practice: free speech, the 
contradictory tugs of the acts determining the freedom of information and the protection of 
 
 
data, as well as the requirement of many funding bodies for research materials to be placed in 
public repositories. The amassed consequences of these regulations and requirements are 
poorly understood and are only slowly finding a way into doctoral training programs, which 
is a discourtesy to a future generation of anthropologists and could lead to a severe crisis of 
representation or fines and prison sentences. 
As I have said, the ethos of existing research ethics codes is paternalistic and oriented 
toward geographies which have disappeared. Current guides encourage mindfulness of 
important issues but will not protect or guide anthropologists in the fields of critical writing 
or objection. To a great extent, these codes assume anthropologists want to like and get to 
know those they work amongst; they also assume that those anthropologists work amongst 
will want to get to know, like, and learn from the researcher, which seems like a form of 
complacency from the era when things were black and white. How then is the new normative 
anthropologist to be ethically recoded and positioned as a post-postcolonial being? 
 
Conclusion 
 
The blitzkreig worked. The sadhus set in motion a process that restricted what I could 
publish. Along the way, although no one said it openly, it was obvious to me that for the most 
part academic institutions are not in a position to match objections or threats from influential 
and nimble transnational organizations. Having had a few years to consider the objections 
raised, I am no closer to being persuaded that the perspective they presented to me was 
sincere. In fact, I find much of what they had to say to resemble what other scholars have 
characterized as a deliberate and strategic attempt to control what is publicly known about 
them. Having said that, I joyfully acknowledge that they have pushed my anthropology on. I 
had been trained in a conservative and careful ethnographic tradition of British Social 
 
 
Anthropology, and I had paid insufficient attention to thinking about and refining how that 
writing might be read; nor had I really come to terms with whom or what I was writing for.  
Anthropology as a discipline could probably carry on regardless. An objection piloted 
into the ivory tower is unlikely to bring the whole edifice down. However, this experience 
gave me the opportunity to see the consequences of the structures of anthropology more 
clearly than before. I do not think we should tear up the canon and start from scratch. There 
is, however, a need to develop more robust mechanisms for explaining and defending what 
the discipline is, what it does, and why this matters. Finally, I think we need to retire the 
figure of anthropologist-as-Malinowski from our ethical codes. The style of anthropology he 
represents continues to strongly inform the ways in which the anthropologist is conceived as 
an ethical being. What if the codes were reconceived using the frames, tropes, and 
engagements of contemporary practice within anthropology? 
There are many figures to choose from, of course, and a combination of figures would 
probably be better than one, but imagine the consequences of replacing Malinowski with 
someone like Didier Fassin, for example. Fassin’s (2013a) research on policing in Paris might 
form part of the basis for a more general rethink about the shape and direction of ethical 
engagement in anthropology. He focuses on the everyday life of police patrols in 
neighborhoods mostly populated by working-class families from North and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using a method he describes as “non-participant observation,” he followed the 
everyday and mundane activities of patrols, the relationships between police officers and with 
various publics, against the backdrop of a broader context, specifically the racialization of 
state discourse on immigration and security. He shows how policing has become an 
enforcement of the social order. Police have become subject to quantified objectives, which 
lead them into roles far removed from their own expectations; the result is violent and 
counterproductive policing.  
 
 
Significantly, the resulting publications make a strong case for the importance of 
ethnography in public life. The struggles of power, race, and representation he describes are 
in time with the world. He navigates the reluctance of institutions to grant “access,” and 
chooses sides carefully. He sides with the ethnography, loyalty to both the police he has 
known through professional interaction and to those policed through a general concern about 
social justice. Fassin makes explicit and clear what I think many anthropologists do anyway: 
“I do not chose one side—that of the youth—but being physically present on the other side—
that of the police—I am in a position to observe what happens during the encounters between 
the two and later relate these findings to the larger picture of state interventions” (2013b: 
641). The active focus of his research (police) is not the primary focus of his interest (social 
justice). This methodological conjuring or displacement is entirely absent from the way ethics 
codes are currently conceived and research practice commonly articulated. 
An ethics rewritten around the structures, politics, and geographies of research 
informed by ideas drawn from contemporary research practice would gently reorient the 
discipline. Fassin’s research has also gone far beyond the academy and has become part of a 
national debate in France about the structures of policing and the racialization of public 
culture. In the process, his writing theorizes the ways in which ethnography can become a 
public good and a way of creatively and openly exploring the moral sentiments of contentious 
processes. In this way, using the practice of someone like Fassin as a basis for refinement, the 
focus of research ethics could be broadened, or bumped forward, to include engagement as 
part of “normal” practice rather than as a scary and unanticipated epilogue. 
Leaving aside the restrictions placed on the material I could include in some sections 
of the book I eventually wrote on the earthquake, I would like to think that the content was 
positively influenced by the uneasy experiences recounted here. My firm intention was that a 
reader would not have to be an anthropologist to understand my purpose. There remain 
 
 
critical sections oriented by ethnographic authority—but I wrote as myself, made all the more 
aware of myself by the encounters with sadhus. I have a line, but I try to make it clear how 
and why I walk that line and not others. There are also views from different perspectives on a 
range of post-earthquake issues. I have not tidied everything up and have left uncertainty to 
protrude when that is what ethnographic encounters suggested. Differing views of the disaster 
became one of the principal motifs, including the perspective the sadhus presented. However, 
when the book was reviewed by the UK’s Financial Times the reviewer complained that my 
refusal to judge was frustrating and the ethnographic examples I used were too “anecdotal” to 
be conclusive. Ho-hum! 
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Notes 
 
 
1. Extracts of the speech given at the swearing in of Modi as chief minister were posted on 
Redff.com on December 23, 2002, at 15:24 IST (from PTI) under the title “BJP to replicate 
Gujarat experience: Venkaiah.” 
2. The English term “good work” is used in Gujarat for the types of humanitarian intervention 
discussed here. The term captures the spirit in which many organizations with clear religious 
and political agendas chose to present their activities. 
3. 2004. “In bad faith? British charity and Hindu extremism report summary.” London: 
AZAAZ—South Asia Watch Ltd. 
4. Sewa International, Annual Report: April 2012–March 2013. 
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